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[ Introduction] 
On 20 June 1988, after around four months of negotiations 
between the two countries, Japan made an agreement with the United 
States to liberalize the Japanese beef and citrus aarket fro. April 
1991. Four days later it made an agreement with Australia which was 
sUbstantially the same as the one with the United States. This was 
a remarkable achievement as many Western researchers believed at 
the time that t he influence of the domestic agricultural lobby on 
Japanese policy-making was such that Japan would not open up its 
highly protected and less co.petitive domestic agricultural market. 
This was based on a more general belief that because of the do.estic 
c lout of protectionist agricultural groups within Japan, Japan would 
not reciprocate benefits it had rece ived from an international 
trade regiae predicated on free trade principles. 1 The announcement 
of the liberalization of Japan 's beef market in 1988 not only shook 
this belief but also rais ed the question of whether this 
announcement heralded a fund amental change in Japan's exter at 
economic policy-mak i ng system, and eventually a change in Japan's 
contribution to the international ec onomic systea. Despite the 
noteworthy implications of the 1988 agreement, not auch attention 
has been paid to how the decision making process in Japan produced 
such a decision. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the policy- making 
process in Japan during the bilateral talks between the U.S. and 
·. 
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Japan on the liberalization of Japan's beef aarket in 1988. To this 
end, this paper, firstly, will survey the three conventional 
policy-aaking models of the Japanese political economy. Secondly. 
it will look at the whole negotiation process of the beef talks 
between the U.S. and Japan in 1988. dividing it into three stages. 
Thirdly. it will apply each of the policy-making .adels to the three 
stages of the beef talks and examine whether the mo de ls have 
explanatory power in describing the talks. It will point out the 
strengths and deficiencies of these explanatory frame orks . 
Finally, this paper will propose an hypothesis concerning the 
negotiation process and examine whether this hypot hesis is valid in 
the specific instance of the beef talks. 
The major explanation of this paper is that in the 
liberalization talks on beef between the U.S. and Japan. the Pri.e 
Minister and agricultural "tr ibe" politicians of the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party(LDP) played major roles in determip.ing the 
Japanese position in the negotiations and in the decision to make 
several concessions to U.S. requests at different stages in the 
negotiations. These political leaders were in a position to 
determine a negotiating position by taking into account the 
comprehensive national interests of Japan. which are determined not 
only by short term and domestic oriented considerations but also by 
longer terM and internationally oriented considerations. 
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This 'political leaders model' or 'Neo-Elitis.' may not 
be so uncommon in other de.ocratic countries, particularly in a 
country having a republican political system in which the president 
can exert a large influence on policy formulation. However, this 
explanatory framework is rather idiosyncratic within the 
literature of the Japanese political eco no.y, which tends to 
emphasize the uniqueness of Japanese policy-making processes . That 
is, in terms of the way in wbich a policy is for.ulated, many 
analysts regard consensus-building as the typical Japanese method of 
policy formulation . 2 For example, the pluralist model sees 
agricultural interest groups as preventing Japan from opening up 
its agricultural markets and the statist .odel stresses constant 
interactions between bureaucrats and interest groups in the process 
of making policies. It is from this perspective then that this 
paper attempts to propose a new analytical framework to serve as an 
alternative to the conventional explanatory models of the Japanese 
political ~conomy. 
The significance of this paper lies not onJy in the 
contribution it makes to the existing literature on the Japanese 
political economy but also in what its conclusions tell us about the 
future shape of the international economic order . A growing number 
of analysts believe that the post World War II order sustained by 
the dOllinant political and economic power of the U.S. is on th~ 
wane due largely to a relative decline in U. S. economic power . At a 
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ti.e when the international economi c syste. is being transforaed, it 
is beco.ing iNportant to understand how the second and third 
econoaic powers, that is. Japan and Ger.any. will behave in the 
current economic system in order to predict what form the 
emerging international economic regi.e will take. If they challenge 
the hege.onic power of the U.S .. there might be a rapid 
t ransforwation of the current regime . If they co-operate with the 
U. S .. the present international system might last longer . Of 
course. the behavior of Japan will not be the only factor that will 
de t ermine the shape of the next international econo.ic syste • . 
Howevpr, it is obvious that an understand i ng of how Japanese policy 
is arr ived at .ill give some i ndication of what the forthcoming 
international economic regime might look like. 
Before proceeding to discuss the process of the beef 
negotiations between the U.S. and Japan in 1988 , some definition 
should be made. In this paper , 'li bera lization' is understood as 
the replacement of i mport restraint border measures such as i.port 
quota systems by such measures as duties or taxes which 
are legitimate under the principles of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . To be more specific. 'liberalization' is 
defined as a measure undertaking the general elimination of 
Quantitative restrictions on imports which is prescribed in Article 
Xl of the GAIT. 
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[Three Main Models of the Japanese Political Econo~J 
When we look at the literature of the Japanese political 
economy, as Okimoto points out, there are now three .ain .odels of 
the Japanese poli tical econo.y, na.ely, Bureaucratic Statisll, 
Pluralism and Elitis • . 3 This chapter will present a brief outline 
of these model s and the events of Japanese politics which have been 
explained by these models. 
(Consensus Making Model) 
Before looking at the three main models of the Japanese 
political economy, it should be noted that there was, in fact, a 
fourth model used mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, to explain 
Japanese politics, that is, the consensus- making model. This model 
emphasised that the conspicuous feature of decision making in 
Japanese politics is that political actors in Japan try to arrive 
at a decisi on by consensus among them.· Kerlinger argues that ~the 
code calls for the group to reach decisions toge ther al ost by a 
sort of empathy . The function of a chair an is, therefore, not to 
help people express themselves freely. but to divine the will of 
the group, presumably on the basis of the divined will~.6 Therefore 
this model stresses that due to this nature of decision making a 
formal decision is preceded by long informal discussions among 
those in positions of influen e, and the formal meeting or 
conference is held more for the purpose of putting the formal staap 
of approval on a decision previously made. 6 
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However. as Calder points out. ~ [ clareful analysis of the 
late 1940s. the 1950s the early 1960s. and even the early 1970s [of 
Japanese public policies] suggests a pattern of frequent political 
turbulence and policy fluidity in Japanese politics~ . 7 This ~calls 
into question conventional notions that Japanese policy.aking is 
har.onious and consensus oriented". a E.pirical analysises of 
Japanese public policies after the second world .ar. such as the 
voluntary export restraint measure of auto.obile in the early 80s, 
sho.s conflict and change as a do.inant feature of Japanese 
politics. 9 Therefore. the consensus-making .odel nowadays see.s to 
be less relevant as an analytical framework of Japanese political 
economy. 
(Bureaucratic Statism) 
The bureaucratic statist model stresses that Japanese 
bureaucrats dominate the field of policy .aking i n Japan . 1 0 The 
ma i n political actors within the statism paradig. are bureaucrats 
who are capable of sensing the collective national interests and 
are endowed 1J i th the po.er to pu tit into e ff ec t. 1 I Accord i ng to 
Statis •• the main political and legal leverage for bureaucrats 
largely stems from Japan's traditional politi cal background. 
Firstly. since Japanese politicians traditionally do not have any 
staff to draft resolutions for the.. bureaucrats have had to take 
on this role. and have thus been fully involved in the law making 
6 
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process. As a result. Japanese bureaucrats. who have accumulated 
their own knowledge and experience in aaking law. tend to be in a 
superior position to ordinary politicians. Secondly. traditionally 
Japanese bureaucrats have used ' administrative guidance' lz as well 
as legi s lative measures to persuade industries to follow their 
policies. For these reasons, bureaucrats in Japan. Statis. 
maintains. are relatively independent fro. the pressure of either 
interest groups or politicians in drawing up and imple.enting 
pol icies. 
The bureaucratic do.inance model attempts to explain why. 
despite the pluralistic nature of Japanese politics in which a 
number of vested interest groups oppose even a slight policy 
change , Japan as a nation state has acted in the international sphere 
as if it has a sole national goal and is a rational actor pursuing 
the collective interests of the state. Thus. it tends to be used to 
explain how Japan has been able to respond to foreign pressures in 
a number of areas. such as the de - regulation of foreign invest.ent 
into Japan and financial markets. 1 J It is also used to explain 
totally opposite Japanese behavior. for example. hOIf the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) implemented industry 
'targeting' policy to nurture infant industries. and how the 
Ministry of Agriculture. forestry and fisheries (MAFF) subsidized 
and protected Japan's agricultural industries. 14 
7 
(Pluralis.) 
Pluralism is based on the assuaption that no particular 
actor or group of actors do.inates the policy .aking process in 
Japan . Pluralists assu.e that there is a wide range of access 
points for interest groups seeking input into the policy - ~aking 
process. Policy -.aking is regarded as the process in which political 
actors possessing diverse and intrans itive interest groups co.pete 
with each other in order to .axi.ize their own interests. IS In the 
plural ist paradigm the main political actors are various kinds of 
intere~t groupS whic.h try to aaxi.ize their interest by influencing 
the policy making process of Japan dlrectly , or through lobbying 
politicians and bureaucrats. 
Krauss and Muramatsu suggest that Japan's pol i ti cal systell 
demonstrates what they call 'patterned pluralism'. III They 
characterise Japanese politics in t he following way : ~ ( l ) influence 
is widely distributed; (2) .ul tiple points of access to policy 
making exist; and (3) interest groups are relatively autonomous from 
the state and compete against others for influence~. 17 They note 
the linkagp.s between each bureaucrat ic agency and i nterest groups 
ovp.r whose interests the agency has jurisdiction. Because of these 
linkages. they argue. the impact of interest groups on government 
is not open - ended and fluid. but rather is restricted to 
particular pattern s in specific areas of policy. As another 
variety of this paradigm. Kusano. in his study at t he U.S .-Japan 
8 
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orange negotiations in 1978-79, pointed to the emergence of 
inter-state interest groupS, in the for,. of several American orange 
companies actively lobbying Japan's polic~akers in the negotiation 
process. 18 
Calder looks at the relations between Japan's ruling 
elite and interest groups. He argues that because of the perception 
of vulnerability spreading among the ruling elite and the distorted 
electoral system in favor of rural votes, in times of political or 
econollic crisis inefficient sectors in Japan have been subsidized, 
while in times of social stability the interests of big business 
have had higher priority. 19 
Pluralism is used to explain such questions as the 
closed nature of Japan's less competitive domestic markets, such as 
agriculture. For example, Alan Rix argues that Japanese 
agricultural protectionism has resulted from the political 
effectiveness of the Japanese farm lobby and its ability to 
influence trade policy via the I.DP and MAFF.20 
(Eli tism) 
The conventional notion of Elitism sees the country as run 
by a number of elite leaders from three more or less equal entities 
- big business, the bureaucracy and the LDP, The essence of this 
explanatory framework is that a small number of political actors 
9 
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dominate the policy formulation process. 21 
According to the Japan Inc. aodel. advanced by one branch 
of the proponents of Elitisa. Japan is run by a triu~virate of 
business. the bureaucracy. and the Liberal Deaocratic Party. ~[T]he 
organized business, the party government, and the administrative 
bureaucracy are the three legs of the tripod on which the Japanese 
political systea rests . The spectacle of Japanese politics is in a 
sense a dramatic production. presented jointly by the business 
community, the ruling party, and the adainistrative bureaucracy. ~22 
The Japan Inc. model is used to explain the overall 
characteristics of t he post - war Japanese economic development. It 
sees that there was a consensus of values widely shared in Japan 
that emphasized rapid econo.ic growth of Japan. This consensus 
became the basis for ~the managed economy~ of Japan coordinated by 
the Economic Planning Agency an d the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry(MITI). Kaplan mainta i ns that the tactics of 
economic planning developed after the World War II are evident in 
the computer, motor vehicle and steel industries. 23 
Some flaws in the Japan Inc. model are pointed out by 
Okimoto. He says that this model ~fails ... to account for the deep 
seated discord. clash of interests. and sectoral variations in 
government -- business relations in Japan. ~24 Oki~oto argues that 
1 0 
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Japan Inc. model cannot explain why the Japanese auto industry 
accepted the government plea of voluntary export restraints to the 
U.S . while the textile industry refus ed to give in to si.ilar 
govern.ent pressures. 25 
Apart froll the Japan Inc . lIodel, Eliti s ts in Japan 
have placed considerable e.phasis on the role of the political 
elite. the so called ftzoku giin (tr i be politic i ans) ", in Japan's 
policy lIaking process . 26 Tribe politicians, who have vast 
experience and knowledge of a few sectors such as agriculture and 
construct i on as a result of t heir involvellent with those sectors 
over a considerable period of tille, have become influential on the 
basis of t heir ability to coordinate intra- governmental conflicts 
or conflicts between i nt erest groups and bureaucrats in their 
parti cular areas of specialization. Japanese analysts such as 
Kusano ar gue that it was the tribe politicians who played a key 
role in restructuring Japan's national railways, in bringing about 
a success ful conclusi on to the bee f and citrus nego t i a ti ons between 
Japan and the United States and in various other notable econollic 
events in the mid to late 19XOs. ~7 
These three main models have dOllinated the Japanese 
political economy . Whether these models are applicable for 
explaining Japan's policy making process during the beef talks in 
1988 will be examined later. 
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This chapter will focus on the 1988 talks between the 
U.S. and Japan on the liberalization of t he Japanese beef market. 
The following questions will be addressed : What is the background 
to these talks and how did they start? What stances were taken by 
both sides? How did Japan react during the beef talks? How was the 
issue finally resolved? In providing answers to these questions. 
this chapter will give a chronological account of what happened 
during the beef talks. 
(U. S. -Japan beef talks up to 1988) 
The first attempt by the U. S. govern.ent to open up the 
Japanese beef market was made in September 1977. A delegation of 
officials from the Special Trade Representative's office visited 
Japan to express U. S. interest in expanded agri cultural exports and 
in e liminating Japan's nontariff barriers to U.S. products. 
particularly beef and citrus. Following this request. there were 
i ntensive talks be tween the two governments. In January 1978 they 
sign ed an agreement in which Japan consented to increase the 
import of high-quality beef for hotel use fro. 1.000 tons to 
10. 000 tons on a global basis beginning in the 1978 fiscal year. Z8 
The Japanese side believed that with the completion of 
this agreement the U.S. - Japan beef trade issue had been settled. 
However. new U.S . demands regarding beef and citrus surfaced in the 
spring of 1978 in the context of the Tokyo Round negotiations. 
1 2 
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Several rounds of talks between the two govern.ents on expanding 
Japan s beef quota culminated in Dece.ber 1978 in a second 
agreement. Under the terms of the agree.ent Japan would expand 
its beef-i.port quota fro. 16,800 tons to 30,000 tons by the fiscal 
year 1983. 29 
The total demand for beef in Japan substantially 
increased during the ~arly 1980s. In 1980, the total de.and for 
beef in Japan was 597,000 tons, while the domestic supply of beef 
was 431,000 tons, and 172,000 tons of beef were imported. In 1986, 
the total demand was 819,000 tons (37.11 increase compared with 
1980), the whole domestic supply was 563,000 tons (30 . 61 increase) 
and the aaount of imported beef was 268,000 tons (55 . 81 increase). 30 
(For further related figures, See the tables in Annex 1) 
In January 1984, with the 1978 agreement due to expire at 
the enrl of March. the U.S. demanded the full liberalization of the 
beef and citrus markets in Japan. The Japanese side responded to 
this demand by offering to increase the orange import quota by 
9,500 tons but refused any increase in the beef import quota. The 
U.S. side withdrew its deaand for the full liberalization of Japan's 
beef market, and instead insisted that the orange quota be increased 
by 11,500 tons and the beef quota by 8,500 tons. After several 
rounds of negotiations at an official level negotiations between 
the U.S. and Japan, Japan's Agricultural Minister Ya.a.ura went to 
1 3 
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Leading U.S. Agrfculturai' Exports and Share of Japan (1988) 
Ouantity Value 
<1.000 metric tons) (US$ minion) 
Total To Japan Share of Totaf To Japan Share of Japan Japan 
Feed Grains 55.031 16.745 30.4% 5.912 ·1.836 31.1°,-il 
Corna) 46.356 14.496 31.3 5.063 1.601 31.6 
Wheat. unmilled 40.523 2.921 7.2 4.888 426 8.7 
Soybeans 18.137 3.706 20.4 4.863 1.036 21.3 
CottonOl 1.301 302 23.2 1.975 484 24.5 
Tobaccoc) 219 32 14.6 1.252 212 16.9 
Grain Sorghums') 6.463 2.1 20 32.S 654 218 33.3 
Chickensd) 358 116 32.4 398 138 34.7 
Beef & VealO) 229 163 71.2 1.109 841 75.S 
Porkd) 55 38 69.1 227 182 80.2 
Oranges & Tangerinesf ) 355 114 32.1 201 73 36.3 
Grapefruitse l 463 234 SO.S 222 122 55.0 
Lemons & Limesel 145 118 81.4 102 88 86.3 
a) Exc!udlng seed. b) Excluolng linters. c) Unmanufactured. d) Fresh and frozen . e) Fresh. 
Source: U.S. De~artr:1e .'1[ of Agflculture. 
11-
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T=ade Ba:a~ce between ~.S. ar.d Japan (Sbill.) 
Expo=ts to Japa:1 Impo:-ts !:-om Japan Balance 
1987 31.5 83.6 
-52.1 
1988 42.0 89.6 
-47.6 
1989 48.2 93 . 2 
-44.9 
1990 52.4 90.3 
-38.0 
Source: Mir.ist=y of Finance, JAPAN 
u.s. Ag:-icultu=al exports by count=y of destination (.989) 
Desti:1ation SBill. % 
Japan 8. 15 20.5 
E.C. 6.54 16.5 
liSSR 3.19 8 . 0 
Mexico 2 .77 7. 0 
So\.!th Kore3 2 . 45 6.2 
Canada ~.19 5.5 
Taiwan 1.59 4.0 
China 1.48 3.7 
Egypt 0 . 93 2.3 
Total 39.67 100.0 
Source: USDA Ag£xporter 
~- --
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the U.S . and put forward Japan's agree.ent to increase the import 
quota of beef by 6.900 tons every year f ro. the FY 1984 to 1987 . 
This agreement was to expire at the end of the FY 1987, na.ely in 
March 1988. and it was this expiration which triggered the 1988 beef 
talks. 31 
Although i t is apparent that the 1988 beef talks were 
directly brought abou t by the expiration of the 1984 beef agreement 
he tween the two countries. the international context surrounding 
this issue should be noted. Hattori argues that although the 
US-Japan beef negotiations in the 80s were caused by the fact that 
US domestic demand for beef had declined since the late 70s. the 
issue ~ust also be viewed from the broader perspec tive of the 
changing nature of US -Japan economic relations; in particular the 
rise of Japan as an economic power. and the increasing trade 
imbalance between the two countries . 32 As a r esult of these factors 
and the subsequent relative decline in U. S. economi c power. the 
Ame rican Congress began reque s ting other countries to take a 
reciprocal approach to U. S. initiatives in terms of open i ng up their 
markets. 33 For example. in June 1986. the U. S. took the i~port 
restrictions imposed by Japan on 12 agricultural products to the 
GATT on the grounds that it was against GATT rules. In October 
1987, the GATT panel judged that 10 products out of 12 were against 
GATT rules, and recommended that Japan abolish the import 
restrictions on these products. In February 1988 Japan 
1 4 
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unconditionally accepted this recoaaendation. 34 The overall trade 
deficit of the U.S . in 1987 was USS 159.5 billion. Its trade 
deficit with Japan in 1987 was USS 52.1billion, and Japan's overall 
trade surplus was USS 96.4 billion. 3S 
In shifting the focus to the domestic political situation 
in Japan, another factor underpinning the beef talks can be 
highlighted. Since 1955 Japanese government has been doainated by 
th~ Liberal Democratic Party. In achieving this remarkable feat, 
tbe LDP has relied heavily on electoral support fro. the 
agricultural sector as well as the saall husiness sector. The 1970s 
reveal a pattern which would appear to be a fundamental basis of the 
Japanese political economy. In cases where the protection of 
domestic interests was deemed essential to the survival of those 
in power, the Japanese government consistently resisted outside 
pressure, and any policy proposal that threatened these domestic 
interests was bound to be unsuccessful. 36 From this point of view. 
the beef talks between Japan and the U. S. can be viewed as a site 
for conflict between the political clout of domestic interests in 
Japan and the pressure from the U.S. congress to enhance U.S. 
p.xport perfor.ance by loosening the barriers to entry into 
Japanese domestic markets. 
(First Phase) 
For the purpose of this paper, the whole process of the 
1 5 
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1987-88 beef talks can be divided into three phases. The first phase 
covers the period up to the Sato-Yeutter talks at the end of 
March. The second period runs from the beginn i ng of April to the 
break-up of the second Sato-Yeutter talks at the end of May. The 
third phase dates fro. the end of May to 20 June when the final 
agreement was reached. 
The first phase is the period of pre-negotiation. In this 
period, the U.S. regarded the setting of a timetable to liberalize 
the Japanese beef market by the Japanese government as the 
fundamental pre-condition for commencing the beef negotiations. The 
U.S. Secretary for Agriculture, Lyng, visited Japan in April 1987 
and de~anded that Japan open up its beef market from April 1988. 
The Japanese government responded that it would not be able to 
abolish its import quota for beef. Subsequently, on 2 September 
1987. at a US-Japan trade committee meeting, both sides agreed to 
have talks on the level of Japan's imported beef Quota. 57 At a 
regular meeting between the U.S. and Japan on agricultural products 
on 24 November 1987, the U.S. side again requested the 
liberalization of the Japanese beef market. 
On 20 January 1988, at an official level .eeting between 
the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese government invited the U.S. 
government to start talks on the establishment of quota levels for 
imported beef in FY 1988 by the beginning of the second week of 
1 6 
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February. 38 However, the U.S. maintained its previous position, and 
on 27 February unofficially intimated to Japan that Japan's beef 
market should be liberalized within two years, and that if Japan 
could not satisfy this offer the u.S. would take retaliatory 
measures on the basis of article 301 of the U.S. Trade Act.39 
In the face of the adamant stance taken by the U.S., 
Japan tried several channels to break the deadlock. The Liberal 
Democratic Party(LOP) decided on 2 March to send a delegation of LOP 
politicians to the U.S. to find a solution to this stalemate. 40 The 
delegation was led by Takami Eto, an outspoken representative of 
agricultural interests. The delegation had talks with Yeutter and 
Lyng on 4 and 5 March, but found only that the U.S . determination 
on this issue was too strong for them to draw some concession from 
the U. S. side. On their return to Japan, Eto, i n his briefing to 
Prime Minister Takeshita, made it clear that the U.S. determination 
to liberalize Japan's beef market was so strong that Japan could 
not avo id making some concessions. 41 
On March 15, Maki, the Director General of the Economic 
Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAfF) had a 
talk with the Vice Secretary Smith of the USTR, on this issue. But 
in this talk, both sides reportedly reiterated their original 
positions; the Japanese side expressing its preference to resolve 
the issue by expanding the beef Quota and the U.S. side requesting 
1 7 
the total abolition of the beef quota syste.. 42 
The U.S . stepped up its clai. towards the end of March 
when the 1984 agreement was due to expire, by asserting that if the 
liberalization of beef market were to be delayed as a result of 
J apanese inaction, Japan would have to make so.e co.pensation to 
the U.S. 4 3 Further.ore, the U. S. govern.ent .ade an official 
statement on 23 March that it would take this issue to the GATT i n 
early Apr i l if Japan failed to liberalize the beef market by thp. 
end of March. 44 
The reaction in Japan to this U.S. request was strong. 
In parti cular, opinions within the lOP stiffened. At the sub-
committee meet ing on the liberalization of agricultural products 
headed by Ko ichi Kato , a younger influential figure in the LOP, the 
opinion of the ajority was that Japan should not ask the U.S . to 
start bilateral nego t iations on beef imports to Japan but should 
"f ight again s t" th e U. S. on this issue . 45 Tsut ollu Hata, the 
Chairman of the LDP's Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Research 
Council, said at the meeting that "although Japan should make 
efforts to open bilateral talks with the U.S . , it is not improbable 
that the issue would be discussed at the GATT" . 46 On 27 March, the 
head of the agricultural political lobbying group, "Zenchu", stated 
that he was enraged by the conditions the U.S. had set for 
initiating Japan - U.S. beef Lalks because they constituted a kind of 
1 8 
threat to Japan. 47 On 28 March, thp MAFF, the LDP and beef industry 
people had a .eeting at which it was confirmed that Japan should 
maintain a stance which emphasised the difficulties for Japan in 
opening up its beef market. 48 
Despite these fierce reactions within Japan, the 
government announ ced on 23 March that th e Minister of 
Agriculture, Sato would be sent to the U.S. for discussions. 49 
On 28 March. the Japanese Cabinet endorsed the basic stance to be 
taken at the ministerial talks between Sato and Yeutter, that is, 
that Japan would be prepared to start negotiations on the 
liberalization of its beef market with the U.S .. if the U. S. 
withdrew its proposals regarding (I) the request for so.e 
co mpensation from Japan in the event of a delay in the 
liberalization of Japanese beef market. (2)the request that Japan 
present a concrete timetable for liberalization, and (3) the request 
that Japan li.it border measures to be taken after the 
liberalization. such as import surcharges. so 
Sato had the first official talk with Secretary Yeutter 
of the USTR on 30 March, and reportedly asserted that it was too 
early for Japan to liberalize its beef market . Yeutter repeated the 
original U.S. position and the meeting was suspended on 31 March 
without producing any result. 51 However, later it was clarified 
that at this meeting Sato had virtually agreed to abolish the beef 
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quota system of Japan. and that the real disagree.ent was over the 
~easures to be taken after liberali za ti on. The Japanese side 
insisted on the introduction of an i_port surcharge and the U. S. 
side de~anded that tariffication should be introduced after 
liberalization. Ho.ever. both sides agreed that they .ould not break 
off the negotiations and expressed their desire to keep talking. 5z 
(Second Phase) 
In the second phase. liberalization .as recognized as 
inevitable throughout Japan and in the course of the negotiations 
Japan endeavoured to introduce an import surcharge as a new border 
measure after the liberalization. while t he U.S . consistently argued 
for the introduction of tariffication. 
After the suspension of the negotiations be t ween Sato and 
Yeutt er. a speci al meeting of the GATT .as held i n Geneva on 8 
April at the request of t he U. S. 53 The U. S. at tha t eet i ng 
r equested the establi s hment of a GATT panel to discuss and pass 
judgment on the "illegal" beef import restrictions imposed by the 
Japanese governaent . Since the Japanese govern_ent r e jected the 
establishment of the panel. it was decided that the final decision 
was to be made at a meeting of GATT on 4 May. 54 
On 12 April. meetings at the official level were resu.ed 
between Japan and the United States in Washington. 55 The point of 
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discussion was what kind of border measures could be used to 
replace the beef import quota after liberalization. A proposal for 
an i mport surcharge by the Japanese was r ej ected by the U.S . 
on the grounds that it was against GATT rules. The U. S. also 
declared that Japan should co.pensate the U.S. if Japan would not be 
able to implement the l iberalization within two years. Although the 
Japanese agreed to abolish i t s beef quota in f i ve years, they said 
that they could not abandon the idea of introducing the import 
surcharge . 58 Although this meeting was prolonged until 23 April. 
the two sides were ultimately unable to agree on what measures 
should be taken after liberalization. 57 
In the course of the meeting. the Japanes e asserted t hat 
an import surcharge was l egitillate under GATT rul es . However. the 
U.S . insisted th a t it r.ould not admit any provision which 
legitimated the idea of i mport surcharge . sa This strong U.S. 
r esistance to th e Japanese propo s al to introduc e an import 
surcharge came at a t i me when the U. S. was ar gu i ng wi th the 
European Community (EC ) over whether the EC should abolish its 
import levy on agriculturaJ products from other countries, and 
therefore the U.S . linked the negotiations with the EC with those 
with Japan. 59 Within the Japanese govern.ent there was a 
suggestion that the gap between Japan and the U. S. over the import 
surcharge could be bridged by proposing to introduce a "similar-
measure to the import charge, that is by preserving the nat~re of 
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the import charge and changing only its name. 60 
In Japan, there was strong opposition to giving up the 
idea of an import surcharge. At the LOP's sub-co •• ittee meeting on 
25 April, LOP politicians who favored protecting Japan's 
agricultural industry agreed to liberalize the beef market but 
refused to make any concessions on import charges. The same day, 
Yamanaka. Chairman of the Diet Members' League for the Promotion of 
the Livestock Industry, said that the LOP should pass a resolution 
opposing the abolition of an import surcharge on imported beef to 
put pressure on the U.S. at the forthcoming beef talks. 61 However, 
throughout the second phase, the predominant feeling was that 
liberalization was inevitable. and even the vice president of 
"Zenchu" said on 26 May that the liberalization was unavoidable. 62 
In order to break the deadlock, Sato left Japan on 26 
April and started talks with Clayton Yeutter t h~ next day. With 
regard to the timing of the liberalization, he offered to 
liberaLize in three years while the U.S. proposed four or five 
years. However, the two sides could not find a compromise on border 
measures after liberalizatioo . 63 On 4 May. the negotiations broke 
down . The Japanese Vice - Minister of Agriculture. Forestry and 
Fisheries. Goto declared that the Japanese proposal presented at the 
meeting. and in particular the timetable for liberalization . was 
no longer endorsed by the government. 6. 
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(Th ird Phase) 
The third phase brought a further concession from the 
Japanese side and the successful conclusion of the beef talks. 
On 4 May. at a GATT council eeting, the U. S. and 
ustralia requested that a GATT panel be established in order to 
investigate Japan's import restrictions on beef. This request was 
accepted and the council agreed to establish the panel. 65 However, 
five days after the breakdown of the beef talks, both govern.ents 
expressed their willingness to resolve the .atter through bilateral 
negotiations. The U.S. gove rnment suggested to the Japanese 
government that if the issue was to be put to the GATT, the U.S . 
administration would not be able to flexibly respond to a possible 
new proposal for concessions from the Japanese government. 66 The 
Japanese government believed that if the beef issue were put to the 
GATT, it would be def initely judged as illegal under GATT rules. 6 7 
On 9 May, the senior members of the LDP and those of the 
Japanese govern.ent said that they expected the issue of beef 
liberalization to be settled through bilateral talks between Japan 
and the U.S. 88 The next day, Agriculture ~inister Sato, responding 
to a question during a meeting of the standing com.ittee of the 
House of Councilors, said that when the beef talks between Japan 
and the U. S. resumed, Japan would make every effort to resolve the 
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issue as soon as possible by using every possible channel. Sg The 
sa.e day, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz stated that he hoped there 
would be an early settle~ent of this issue through bilateral 
negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. and e.phasized that the 
U.S. was prepared to accept the introduction by Japan of a high 
level tariff on imported beef into Japan if Japan abandoned the 
introduction of an import surcharge. 70 On 19 May. Foreign Minister 
Uno had a meeting with Yeutter and it was agreed to resume the beef 
talks between the two countries. 7\ 
Meanwhile, inside Japan, more and .ore Japanese p01icy-
makers were co_ing to believe that Japan should accept the 
tariffication of imported beef. Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 13 May 
reported that since Prime Minister Takeshita wished to settle the 
issue before the Toronto Su •• it scheduled for mid June. and since 
there was a growing recognition that the U.S. would never admit the 
Japanese idea of an import surcharge, some policy makers centered 
around the prime ~inister's office believed that tariffication was 
inevitable if the beef talks were to be concluded successfu11y.7z 
However. anti-liberalization groups such as the MAFF opposed the 
introduction of tariffication on the grounds that the price of 
Japanese beef would be influenced by the price of beef on the 
international market which would be too low to enable the Japanese 
livestock industry to secure its profit. 73 
2 4 
-
-.......... 
-
On 31 May. the meeting of officials resu.ed in 
Washington. The Japanese presented the tariffication proposal. 
This proposal contained two elements. Firstly. Japan would raise 
the tariff rate on beef from 251 to 751. Secondly. this rate .ight 
be varied temporarily in accordance with fluctuations in the 
international price of beef. The Americans totally rejected the 
second element of this proposal and insisted furthermore that the 
in cr ease in the tariff rate should be limited to 501. The U.S. 
proposed the introduction of a safeguard measure (the temporary 
restriction of imports in an emergency situation) .7. The Japanese 
deci ded to consult on that proposal with the Japanese policy 
makers concerned, and the meeting was suspended on 3 June. 
On 3 June, President of the U. S. Reagan and Takeshita met 
in London. Both l eaders agr eed that the be e f issue should be 
resolved at the bilateral level as early as possible . 75 After the 
meeting the Japanese govern ent decided to accept the U. S. pr oposal 
on safeguard measures . 76 
On 14 June. the meeting between Japanese and U.S. 
officials resu.ed. Both sides discussed the conditions for 
initiating the safeguard measures, and the level of tariffication 
to be introduced by Japan after liberalization. The U. S. insisted 
that the safeguard measure should only be able to be enacted in the 
first two years of liberalization while the Japanese asserted that 
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the measure should be allowed to be taken any ti.e there was an 
excessive increase in thp. a.ount of imports. 77 This discussion 
continued until 18 June. and substantial progress was made . The 
United States made a concession over the level of the beef tariff. 
and both parties agreed that the tariff rate would be 70~ in the 
first year of liberalization. but only 60~ in the second year and 
in the third year, 50~. 
Responding to this progress. Yeutter arrived in Tokyo on 
18 June and began ta l ks with Sato on 19 June on the conditions for 
the operation of the safeguard measure. By the end of the day both 
sides agreed that the period in which the safeguard ~easure could 
be applied should be three years, and the co ndition for its use 
after that period would be discussed at the Uruguay Round trade 
ta lks. 78 The agreement over the safeguard measure marked the 
successful conclusion of the beef talks in 1988. The final outco.e 
of the agreeqent was as follows; 
(1) Japan's beef market was to be lIberalized in FY 1991. 
(2) The import Quota on beef would be increased by 400,000 tons 
every year until 1991 . 
(3) The tariff rate for imported beef after liberalization would 
be increased from 25~ to 75~. 
(4) The safeguard measure could be used at any time during the 
first three years following liberalization. 79 
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This chapter will look at how the conventional models of 
the political econollY of Japan to explain the outcome of beef 
1988 negotiations between the U.S . and Japan. As we have already 
seen in the first chapter, there are a variety of explanations even 
within each lIodel. Therefore, a specific lIodel of each paradiga 
will be established before proceeding to examine whether that .odel 
can adequately explain developments in the three phases of the beef 
negotiations. Finally, the strengths and deficiencies of each lIodel 
in terms of its usefulness in explaining the process of negotiation 
in the beef talks will be examined. 
(Statisll) 
In the first chapter, we saw that Statis. can be broadly 
characterized as a model of bureaucratic dominance. However as 
Oki mo to has pointed out, each bureaucracy has its own sphere of 
influence. 8o In the area of Japanese agricultural policy, as Okimotu 
has noted, it is MAfF that plays a dominant role in shaping 
policies. MAFF is ~a domestically oriented, politicized bureaucracy 
anxious to protect the livelihood of Japanese farllers against the 
inroads of more competitive foreign producers. ~81 Therefore, in 
order to evaluate whether the policy-making model of bureaucratic 
Statism is valid for this issue it is necessary to exa.ine the role 
of MAfF in the negotiation process. 
(MAFf's influence on the beef industry of Japan) 
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In Japan, the ad.inistration of the beef industry is 
conducted by MAFF .ainly through the Livestock Industry Pro.otion 
Corporation (LIPe ) , one of the 99 corporat ions of the 'Jigyodan' 
type attached to National Government .inistries . The .ain aim of 
the LIPe is to provide fund s for the pro.otion of further 
modernization of the livestock industry. Its pri.ary task is to 
administer the importation of livestock products and use the profits 
from this trade to subsidise the domestic livestock industry . 
Established by MAFF in 1961, the LIPe is an ad.inistrative arm of 
MAFF. It is supervised by the Livestock Bureau of MAFF which is the 
bureaucratic decision maker . In close consultation with farmer 
organizations and politicians, especially in the LDP, the Livestock 
Bureau officials "are i n a position to have a dominant effect on 
[beef) policies" . 82 In a s ense , MAFF plays a similar kind of role 
to that played by MITJ in relation to Japanese industr i es . 
The government not only r egulates de.and for i.ports by 
set ting quotas, but a lso acts as the chief purcbasi ng agent through 
a system of designated trading bouses. Since 1966 the LIPe bas used 
its own bare of the beef import quota to ensure that imports do not 
have an adverse effect on domestic prices and consequently on 
production . 8s It has done this through its control of the buying 
and selling prices of the beef imported under the quota share 
arrangement. The levies that the LIPe has collected on beef i.ports 
as a result of its .arket regulation have been used to finance the 
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support given to the dairy industry and to provide subsidies to the 
do.estic beef industry. 8. 
MAFF. through the LIPe. not only regulated day to day 
beef policy. but .as also involved in changing that poLicy. For 
example. it is well kno.n that a senior bureaucrat in the Livestock 
Bureau. MAFF. vigorously argued in favour of increased beef import 
quotas in 1973. His advice was accepted and the quota was 
inc reased . 86 From this. it is evident that MAFF had substantial 
influence upon Japan's beef policies. 
(MAFf 's role at the liberalization negotiations: First Phase) 
In the first phase, ~AFF's official stance on beef 
liberalization .as to oppose any liberalization of Japan's beef 
market. In January. MAFF announced the official policy for the 
forthcoming beef talks .ith the U.S .. 86 According to that policy. 
MAFF would maintain the import quota system in the next three to 
fi e years and .ould consider the question of the liberalization of 
beef imports only after 1990 .hen the Uruguay Round was due to 
finish. 
However. MAFF's unofficial stance was that if the U.S. 
persisted in its demand for the liberalization of Japan's beef 
markets Japan would liberalize its beef markets, but it would do so 
only on the condition that it also would introduce on import 
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surcharge on foreign beef. This stance amounted to a recognition by 
MAFF officials that if the U.S. took Japan's i.port restrictions 
on beef to the GATT. it would most probably be judged as 
contravening the GATT rules, and Japan would be forced to liberalize 
its beef markets unconditionally . 87 This stance also took into 
account the prospects for the demand and the supply of beef in 
Japan in the near future. According to a report released by the 
Livestock Industry Promotion Council, which operates under the 
auspices of the MAFF, while the demand for beef in 1995 would be 
800,000 tons the domestic supply of beef would be no more than 
480,000 tons. The 320,000 to 40U.000 tons shortfall, the report 
stated, should be supple.ented by imported beef.s8 So.e Japanese 
analysts cOlllllented that. the expansion of the illport quota would not 
be enough to respond to the pace of the increase in the demand for 
beef and therefore liberalization would be required. 
As pressure froll the U. S. increased throughout the first 
phase, thp. official s t ance of MAFF gradually changed. In .id 
February , MAFF officials i~plied at the negotiations that they had 
already started to consider the liberalization of Japan's beef 
market as a viable option. This view is supported by a comment by a 
~AFF senior official who stated that in order to sLart the talks 
"Japan may have to prepare the 'ultimate' option in its pocket".S9 
The unofficial stance of MAFF was therefore identical to 
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-that of the government of Japan. Fro. this, it can be concluded 
that the MAFF did indeed playa deci s ive role in the policy- .aking 
process of the beef issue . In reality, "Japan's stance towards this 
[beef ] issue was .ainly being made in consultations between the 
director general of the Livestock Industry Pro.olion Corporation, 
MAFF and agricultural tribe politicians"~O 
(Second Phase) 
After the failure of the f i rst Sato - Yeutter talks, MAFF 
advo cated the introduction of an import surcharge as a border 
measure after liberalization . 91 In a sense, ~AFF had then made 
publi c i ts unofficial position . It can be said that this was a 
c h~nge in attitude that MAFF had expected to make , because in so 
doing , MAFF could satisfy the U. S. and simultaneouslY, protect its 
sphere of influen ce by establishing an import surcharge syste •. 
Under the i mport surcharge system, all import surchar ge flows into 
MAFF which would contr i bute t o the ma intenance of MAFF's influence 
o r impo rt e d be e f. How ever , if ta r iffication wer e t o be 
introduced, t he tariff on imported beef goes into national accounts 
from whj ch MAFF would not get any benef i ts . This is why MAFF was so 
opposed to the introduction of tariffication. 
However. this change in official s tance did not result 
in a breakthrough in the bep.f talks. Faced with America's ren~~l to 
accept anything less than liberalization at the meeting on March 
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15, MAFF proposed a compromise which would have inserted into the 
agreement the phrase: 'Japan has th e power to set up border 
measures after the liberalization of beef imports, but it does not 
hinder the expansion of the importation of U.S. beef into the 
Japanese .arket'. 92 This proposal was also rejected by the U.S .. 
MAFF made another proposal in order to break the 
deadlock and to protect its own interests. The changes were, 
however, largely cosmetic . The proposal had not abandoned import 
surcharges but had simply ascribed to the. another name. This 
proposal was al s o rejec ted by the United States. 93 Fro. these 
attempts, it is obvious that MAFF was struggling to keep the 
concept of import surcharge alive in the negotiation process. This 
behavior is quite understandable when we consider that MAFF's 
objective is to protect the domestic livestock industry and in doing 
so, to main ta in its sphere of influence. 
In this s t age, there was a large discrepancy between the 
concession that MAFF was able to make and the concession that the 
government needed to make i n order to arrive at a successful 
conclusion of the beef talks. It was apparent that "liberalization 
without import surcharge would have a crucial damage to Japan's 
livestock industry"94 and diminish MAFF's influence over this 
industry. It can be said that MAFF had no roo~ to make any further 
concession. After the break -up of the second Sato- Yeutter talks, a 
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senior MAFF official said that the beef dispute would be discussed 
by at the members of the GATT panel. 
(Third Phase) 
After the breakup of the second .inisterial meeting 
between the two countries. MAFF did not abandon the idea of 
introducing an import surcharge. On 24 May. the Vice Minister Goto 
of MAFF stated that MAFF would not abandon the idea of an i.port 
surcharge. 95 
However. MAFF suddenly altered its stance at the 
official level talks which started on I June. According to the Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, MAFF was coming to accept that Japan should abandon 
the introduction of an import surcharge and instead replace it .ith 
a tariff measure. 96 This concession broke the deadlock in the beef 
talks and resulted in the successful conclusion of the negotiations. 
(Deficiencies of Statism) 
It is hard to believe that MAFF was responsible for the 
initiative that broke the deadlock in the U.S. - Japan beef 
negotiations in 1988 . Although MAFF had so.e influence over the 
policy - making process in the first and second phase. there is no 
reason to believe that the initiative that brought about the 
change in MAFF's position from one that advocated adherence to the 
idea of an import surcharge to one that called for the introduction 
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of tariffication measures had originated within MAFF itself. There 
was no reason wh) MAFF would seek to diminish its sphere of 
influence by liberalizing its beef markets. 
St.atist analysts II\3Y object to this explanation. Statists 
may argue that YAFF has been "internationalized~ and can therefore 
take into account the comprehensive interests · do.estic and 
international - of Japan . Consequently. the ini tiative which 
changed MAFF's stance in the third phase did. afterall. come from 
MAFF itself. ~agao. in presenting evidence of the 
"internationalization" of MAFF. highlights the establishment of a 
new vice minister level post to deal with international affairs. 97 
However. this is not sufficient proof that MAFF has been 
"internationalized". So far, there has been no structural change 
in WAFF to show that MAFF has changed from a domestic interests 
or-iented lIinistry to an internationally oriented one. 
Other Statist anal ysts main t ain that the sudden change in 
MAFF's position was the result of inter-ministerial conflicts. Alan 
Rix argues that "(flor the GATT negotiations, in t erministry 
bargaining was intense, the ~ITI pushed strongly for 
agricultural concessions for Japanese industrial exports".98 
Ho~ever, "MITI was not involved in this beef dispute".99 Although 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly urged ~AFF to make 
concessions to the U.S. there was no sign that MAFF ga e in to the 
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pressure from VOFA. The study focusing on inter - ministerial 
conflicts has, therefore. little relevance in this particular case. 
It is difficult then to think that Statism can fully 
explain the change in the Japanese negotiating position in the 1988 
beef talks . Some other factor must be found to explain why MAFF 
changed its stance twice in the course of the negotiations. 
(Pluralism) 
The major characteristic of pluralism is that this odel 
sees a number of interest groups having influen c e over the 
policy - making process. rather than a small nueber of powerful 
individuals or groups dom i nating the process. 100 In this section 
the focus of the analysis .ill be interest groups in Japan. 
The first task is to clarify whi ch interest groups were 
relevant to the agricul tural pol i cy making process . In this area. 
the most well - known political interest group is Zenchu (the 
National Central Union of Agricultural Co - operatives). This 
organization was set up in 1954 to serve as the politi cal lobbying 
and overall policy making body for Nokyo. the Agricultural 
Co-operative organization to whi ch almost all farmers belong. 101 
Zenchu and Nokyo draw their political power from two 
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layers of Japan's political structure, the electoral systea, and the 
special type of relationship that exists between farmers and the 
Japanese political parties. Firstly. the electoral syste. in Japan 
is currently gerrymandered in favour of rural co •• unities . Under 
the current el ectoral system. only 17 . 2 per cent of the 512 seats 
in the lower house can be described as entirely urban. 102 The other 
428 Di e tmen are returned by electoral districts which include 
farming communities . Because electoral districts are not single 
member consituencies in which each Diet.an can easily get party 
support. but plural member constituencies. and because these 
co •• unities belong to highly organized groups such as local Nokyo. 
Dietmen are extremely dependent on these groups for political 
support. "Under these circumstances. closely knit rural groups in 
an electorate can offer an aspiring candidate bo t h a spring- board 
to power and invaluable practical assistance with campaigning . 
Farming communities. therefore. of ten exercise a politi cal leverage 
greatly in ex cess of their voting strength. even in re l at ive ly 
hi gh ly urbanized elec torates . " 10 3 
Secondly. farmer organi zations have an effec tive web of 
influence brought about by the movement of individuals between 
government departments. semi - government authorities and advisory 
bodies. and the rise of a significant nu.ber of politicians to 
senior positions in farmers organizations . These politicians 
retain strong ties with former colleagues fro. their old 
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organizations. 104 
Business groups also exert pressure on the agricultural 
policy- making process but to a lesser extent and fro. a perspective 
that is diametrically opposed to that of the farming organizations. 
Keidanren (the Federation of EconolDi c Organizations) whi ch 
represents all the major companies in Japan i s said to give a large 
amount of financial suppor t to the LDP. 105 Although corporations 
actually channel their financial assistance to the LDP through 
other organizations, Keidanren wields enormous power within the 
upper echelons of the LDP . From the mid 1970s onwards, Keidanren, 
Nikkeiren (Japanese Federation of Employers' Association ) and the 
Kei zai Doyukai (Japan Committee for Economic Develop.ent ) have all 
grown increasingly concern ed about Japan's agricultural trade 
policies. 106 As lhe critici sm from overseas of the closed na t ure of 
J apan's agricul t ural markets mount ed, business groups became 
progressively more critica l of the poor productivity record of lhe 
agricultural sector. 
(First Phase) 
During the firs t phase, lhere was littl e evidence of 
lobbying on the issue of beef market liberalization. The only 
conspicuous move in opposition to liberalization was by the 
executive of Zenchu when it met on 22 March with those Dietmen who 
were dealing with this issue and with MAFF senior officials, and 
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urged them not to accept the U.S. request for liberalizing Japan's 
beef markets. 107 
With regard to moves supporting lib~ra1ization , an 
import distributor made a speech at WAFF on 8 February urging the 
abandonment of the beef import Quota syste.. 108 
However, there is no evidence that these moves had any 
effect on the policy outcome of the liberalization issue. Despite 
the opposition of Zenchu on 22 March, three days later the cabinet 
decided to liberalize the beef Market. 109 
(Second Phase) 
The lobbying by agricultural interest groups beca.e 
relatively active. On 28t.h March. Zenchu again met with LOP 
politicians and MAFF officials and made a statement that the 
liberalization was difficult for Japan. 1 10 On 19 April, Zenchu had 
a national meeting in Tokyo. and asked senior LDP politicians to 
maintain the position of not opening Japan's beef market. 111 
Keidanren. on thp. other hand, ~aintained a low profile. 
Saito. the head of Keidanren said on 19 April that the issue of 
the beef talks should be resolved at the bilateral level. The ne t 
day. he had a meeting about the beef liberalization issue with U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Wallis. At that meeting. Wallis pointed 
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out that there were two types of trade friction between the U. S. 
and Japan, one long term and the other short te~, and that the beef 
issue was a short term one whic.h should be resolved quickly. liZ 
Saito replied that business organizations in Japan would continue 
in their efforts to alleviate the trade friction between the two 
countries. 
These .oves, however, would appear to be quite irrelevant 
to the negotiation process. During the second stage, the focus of 
the discussion shifted to the import surcharge issue, but the 
co.ments from interest groups were still limited to whether Japan 
should liberalize its beef market or not. It is apparent that the 
interest groups were isolated from the whole context of the 
negotiations. 
(Third Phase) 
At this stage, agricultural interest groups led by Zenchu 
still opposed the liberalization of Japan's beef .arket. Zenchu 
held a national conference opposing the liberalization on June 17, 
two days before the successful conclusion of the negotiations. liS 
However, by this time the intensity of political lobbying had 
largely decreased. For example, on 26 April the Vice President of 
Zenchu told the .edia that if no co.promise was reached at the 
second ministerial meeting the liberalization of the beef .arket 
would be inevitable. I \4 Although his co •• ent was officially 
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denounced two days later by Zencbu. this sbowed that Zenchu was 
lIoving towards acceptance of liberalization. -By and large. the 
result of beef talks in 1988 ~ant a defeat for Zenchu~. I IS 
From tbe evidence above it would see. that Pluralis •• 
which sees the policy-making process as a result of interaction and 
co.petition among several interest groups and political actors. does 
not provide an adequate explanation of the course that the 
liberalization talks took. 
Some pluralist analysts may argue that the lack of 
activity by Keidanren was caused by the fact the political 
leadership and businessmen have shared a co •• on perception of 
issues and have worked to serve business interests. and therefore. 
business~en did not have to participate in the process directly. 116 
However. this argu ent has sOlie flaws. First. there is no evidence 
that business interest groups recognize that political leaders and 
business.en had the same perception over this particular issue . 
Secondly. even if we stand on this assumption that the business.en 
were inherently involved by privately notifying their interests to 
political leaders. it is incomprehensible that when negotiations 
came so close to failure on May 5 these businessmen did not then 
directly intervene into the policy making process. 1 \7 This 
counter-argu~ent is endorsed by Calder. when he argues that ~the 
Federation of Economic Organizations(Keidanren). chief 
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-representative of big business in Japan, in 1986 called for total 
liberalization of restrictions on agricultural i.ports. Yet, 
Japan's producer rice price in 1988 re.ained .ore than eight ti.es 
world levels, with no i ediate indications of a shift to i.ports 
in sight". I 18 Therefore, it is natural to think that Keidanren did 
not have any influence on the policy making process on this 
particular issue. 
(Elitism) 
The conventional notion of Elitis. focuses its analytical 
attention on the role of power elites in politics. This section will 
focus on those politicians with specific ties to agricultural 
interests. 
Elitis., particularly that variant of it which focuses on 
LDP politicians, has become popular a.ong Japanese analysts. 
Behind this, there seems to be a recognition that Japan's 
political situation has changed. 119 In Japan, for a long ti.e it 
was widely believed that it was not parliamentarians but 
bureaucrats who dominated the policy making process. Until the 
late 1960s, there were .any cases in which bureaucrats and not 
Diet.en .ade policies since they al.ost totally .onopolized both 
the information and experience that was indispensable for making 
policies and i.ple.enting them. 
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The reason for this dependence of Diet.en on bureaucrats 
for policy-.aking was that Parliamentarians. unlike their 
counterparts in other countries. usually had few staff to help the. 
to draft the i r own po Ii ci es. 120 The second reason is tha t 
traditionally. Nany Japanese people took it for granted that 
Legislation was to be conceived by bureaucrats; that is, 
culturally. it was deemed that it would be bureaucrats who aade law. 
The third reason is that the Parliament Act prescribes that .ore 
than 50 members of the House of Representatives and more than 20 
members of the House of Councillors must agree to the introduction 
of bill made by politicians before it can he sub.itted to the 
parliament. However, as a result of the LOP's continued do.ination 
the substantial core of the policy-making framework has shifted 
from the parlia.ent to the policy research council of the LOP. 
Because Diet.en tend to specialize in a particular issue for a long 
time within the council. they have acquired knowledge and 
expprjence which is now superior to the knowledge and experience of 
the bureaucrats. Consequently, from the late L960s to early 1970s 
the so - called 'political tribes' (Zoku Giin) composed of those 
politicians who are experts in a particular area emerged in the 
decision ~aking process in Japanese politics. 121 This political 
tribe can be classified into two categories according to their 
experience and influence: the 'masters', who are leaders of tribes 
and the '~b' who are less influential members of tribes. 122 
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The political influence of 'tribes' was enhanced by the 
fact that "low economic growth in the 1970s made it difficult for 
bureaucrats to use fiscal policy as a measure~, because of 
budgetary restraints. 1 Z3 After the so-called oil shock in 1973, 
Japan's economic growth slowed down and the budgetary growth also 
slowed once the Japanese government subsequently tightened its 
fiscal and monetary policy. As a result. the influence of 
bureaucrats based on the allocation of new projects to the private 
sector lessened, Also the budgetary restraints intensified the 
conflicts among bureaucrats over the issue of budget allocation. In 
addition. the emergence of new cross border business and the 
deepening of economic interdependence between developed countries -
the fact that political actors overseas have some influence -
lessened the co - ordination capability of bureaucrats , 124 
Agricultural political tribes usually acted as representatives of 
agr icultural districts so that they tended to be regarded as a part 
of interest groups. However. analysts have recent ly been payi ng 
attention to the role of "masters" of tribes who act not for 
parochial. but for broader, interests , 
(First Phase) 
During the first phase. the 'mob' of the agricultural 
tribes was adamant that there should be no liberalization of the 
beef market , On 17 March, the sub-committee on the liberaliza ion of 
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agricultural products in the LOP had an executive .eeting and .ost 
of those in attendance asserted that Japan should raise the issue at 
the GATT and should not yield easily to the U.S. pressure . 125 On 23 
March, the saae opinions were expressed at a meeting on agricultural 
and fisheries product i.ports. 1 211 Two days later. these two 
co •• ittees passed a resolution that opposed the liberalization of 
beef . 1 27 
On the other hand, the 'masters' of the agricultural 
tribes, such as Koichi Kato and Tsuto.u Hata, despite their 
outspoken opposition to liberalization. had already .ade up their 
minds that liberalization was inevitable. 128 During the first stage, 
they concentrated on how to persuade the 'mob' of the agricultural 
tribe to accept the liberalization of beef. 129 As a first step they 
organized a visit by a delegation of agricultural tribe politicians 
to the U.S. in order to acquaint the 'mob' with the U. S. position . 
Th is method had been used by 'masters' at the 1981 beef talks 130 
The delegation, led by Eto, as expected, came face to face with the 
tough position of the U. S. on this issue when they met Yeutter and 
Lyng. On his return to Japan, Eto informed Prillle Minister 
Takeshita that the U.S. position was very strong and Japan should 
make some concessions. 131 The tactic adopted by the '.asters' had 
been successful. 
(Second Phase) 
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On 21 April at the LDP agricultural sub-co •• ittee .eeting 
there was no longer a .ajority in favour of opposing Washington . On 
25 April, the sub - com.ittee virtually decided to accept the 
liberalization of the beef .arket in a few years, and to let the 
decision on the conditions under which Japan would accept 
liberalization rest with Agricul t ural Minister Sato at the second 
min isterial meeting between the U.S. and Japan . 132 
On 21 April, the Director of the Policy Research Council 
of the LDP made an official statement in which be said that the LDP 
would accept the liberalization of beef imports on the condition 
that import surcharges should be introduced as a border .easure 
after liberalization . 1 33 
However, the second .in isterial talks broke down because of 
d i fferences over the border measures to be taken after 
liberalization. The 'mast ers' of th e agr ic ult ural tribes were 
therefore placed i n a very difficult position . 
(Third Phase) 
After the collapse of the second .inisterial talks, the 
'masters' of the agricultural tribe were forced to decide whether 
they would make a further concession to the U.S. by conceding the 
failure of the proposal to introduce an import surcharge . This was 
a difficult decision because the explanation used by the '.asters' 
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to persuade the '.ob' to accept liberalization had been tbat 
liberalization would not have an adverse affect on Japan's 
livestock industry if an import surcharge were adopted. 
At this stage, there was a difference in position within 
the 'masters' of the tribe. Yamanaka made a state.ent on 25 May 
that if the import charge was not introduced he would resign all 
official positions. 13~ On the other hand, Kato had adopted a stance 
that another concession had to be made. He argued that ~if Japan 
continued to stick to the i.port surcharge, this issue might cause 
a souring relationship between Japan and the U.S . , and therefore 
have a negative impact on other areas of the relations between the 
two countries such as defence. "135 
Because of this difference in opinion between the 
'masters', it was extremely difficult to coordinate a 
representative opinion of the agricultural tribe. However, ·n.i 
May, Abe, Director General of the LOP, on instruction fro. the Prime 
Minister ordered Hata to unify the party's opinion. 136 By early 
June, the agricultural tribe of the LOP appeared to accept the 
withdrawal of the proposal for an import surcharge, which led to 
the successful conclusion of the agreement on 20 June. \37 
The elitist model focusing on the political tribes of the 
LDP does explain Japan's policy making process at the 
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liberalization talks to a large extent, However, it does not 
explain why the 'masters' were able to persuade the '.ob' to 
accept liberalization in the first instance, and then to give up 
the import surcharge that had been the basis for that acceptance. 
One may oppose this view by asserting that the '.asters' 
of agri cultural tribes had the power to persuade the '.ob' to give 
up the introduction of i.port surcharge. However, the beef issue 
was too important for the 'mob' to be so easily persuaded because 
the outco.e of the beef liberalization issue would also deter.ine 
the fate of the agricultural tribe politicians at the next 
election. 138 The fact that at the general election in February 
1990, almost all the agricultural tribe politicians who had 
livestock industry in their e lectorates lost their e lection, only 
serves to underline the political importance of this issue. Given 
th i s factor alone it is hard to believe that the '.ob' were easily 
moved by the 'masters" persuasion . It is more l i ke ly that so.e 
other force induced the agricultural tribes to change their stance. 
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In the analysis of the last chapter. several questions 
r emain to be answered. Statism c ould not provide appropriate 
answers to the Question as to why MAFF suddenly abandoned the idea 
of an import surcharge at the third stage. when to do so was 
contrary to its interests. Pluralism failed to answer the Question 
why usually active lobbying groups such as Zenchu could exert 
little influence on the pol icy-making process on this issue'! 
Elitism cannnot provide sufficient explanation the 'masters' of the 
agricultural tribe could persuade the 'mob' to ~ake further 
concpssions and withdraw Japan's proposal to introduce an i.port 
surcharge. 
These questions can be compressed into one Question: what 
were the factors that had a decisive influence on the policy-.aking 
process throughout the beef talks. especially , between the second 
and third phases? 
ime Mi nlster's power) 
The role of the "Prime Minister" seems to be a central 
element in any hypothesis which purports to explain the 
policy-making process of Japan during the beef talks in 1988. 
George. in her analysis of the prospects for rice 
liberalization, emphasi zes the key role played by the Pri.e 
Minister. the LOP power brokers and agricultural policy leaders. 
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"None of these actors will reveal their bands, hut will be working 
furiously behind the scenes to achieve a co.pro.ise". ~Takeshita's 
breakthrough on beef was based on several factors : he needed to 
make a symbolic gesture at the Toronto Su •• it and he had two 
important political facts on his side: the extre.ely strong 
position of his party in the post - 1986 election Diet and his 
extremely strong factional position within the party" . 1 3 9 In this 
section, I will look at the whole process in the light of the 
hypothesis that the Prime Minister played a key role in the beef 
talks . 
(First Phase) 
During the first phase, Pri.e Mi nister Noboru Takeshita 
showed his willingness several times to resolve tbe beef issue as 
early as possible . At the earlier stage, on 15 January, he made a 
sta t ement that the beef i ssue should be re olved by the end of 
March. 1 4 0 He made similar state.ents on 2& February and 14 March as 
well. 141 This positive attitude is unusual since Japanese pri.e 
ministers tend to refrain from commenting on specific policy 
issues until they become highly political. 
There is some evidence tbat Takeshita was well aware 
that Japan needed to make a large concession to the U. S. over the 
future of Japan's beef i.port quota . In .id March he .ade it clear 
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that the beef issue would be dealt with at the high political level 
rather than at the level of officials. 142 This can be interpreted 
by the Japanese standard that in this parti cular issue not only the 
interests of the bureaucrats - especially those of MAFF - but also 
broader political interests would be taken into consideration. On 
18 March, Abe, Takeshita's right-hand Man and Secretary General of 
the LOP , had a talk with Takeshita, and agreed that ~in order to 
open the beef talks with the U.S. we need to have an option to 
show a compromise plan to the U.S. drawn through the co - operation 
with the LDP~.143 This remark would imply the probability of 
a concession being made from the Japanese side. 
Takeshi ta, i n order to prevent the interest groups and 
agricultural tribe politicians who opposed liberalization froll 
hav i ng some influence on the policy making process, .ade it clear 
at a cabinet ~eeting on 29 March that on the issue of the beef 
talks the cabinet would have t o r espect th e judg ent of t he 
Minister for Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries _ 144 
Furtherlllore, Abe, on instructions fro. Takeshi ta, 
declared at the lIeeting of the Middle and Small Firlls Federation on 
24 March that if the issue of the import quota for beef were to be 
put to the GATT panel, ~the measure being taken by Japan will most 
probably be regarded as the one against the GATT rule". By implying 
that the liberalization of Japan's beef markets was unavoidable, 
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Abe (and Takeshita) were putting pressure on interest groups to 
change tbeir position. 146 
It is clear tbat during tbe first phase, Takesbita had 
already .ade up bis mind that Japan had to liberalise its beef 
markets and bad embarked on a strategy designed to win over the 
major political actors of the LOP. 
(Second Phase) 
During the second phase, Takeshita atte.pted to persuade 
the political actors that the liberalization of the beef sarket and 
its resolution on a bilateral basis were not unbeneficial to Japan. 
On 4 April, wben Sato, returning fro. the talks in the U.S., 
briefed Takeshita on their progress, both agreed that the beef issue 
should be resolved by 4 May . 146 The next day, a spokes.an for tbe 
Japanese Govern.ent announced that the government preferred to open 
up the market and tried to seek a compromise witb the LDP . 147 
In the face of Takeshita's strong determination that the 
beef market should be liberalized. the 'masters' of the 
Agricultural tribe of the LOP made efforts to make interest groups 
recognize that the liberalization was inevitable. Hata, the 
Chairman of the Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Council of the 
LOP, implied at an executive .eeting of Zenchu on 5 April that it 
could be difficult to keep opposing the liberalization of the beef 
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market. His statement was seen by some analysts as an atte.pt to 
push Zenchu toward accepting liberali 72 ti on. 1 48 
At a press conference on 10 April. Takeshita again 
emphasized his determination to resolve the stale.ate of the beef 
talks between Japan and the U. S. by 4 May . 149 Furthermore, on 18 
April, in a speech given at an LOP meeting. Takeshi t a said that 
although "you may have an impress ion that the condition for the 
beef talks propo s ed by the U. S. is extre.ely sever e. President 
Reagan and I agreed at the meeting in January that both Japan and 
th e U. S. mu s t share th e pain accompany i ng the liberal ization 
measures. " 1 &0 It can be argued that in making this statement he was 
making clear hi s determination that the government should consider 
the U. S. proposal positively. 
On 29 April. when the negotiations became tough following 
the U. S. r e j ec t i on of t he i ntrodu ct ion of a n . por t charge . 
Takeshita t old the Vice Minister of MAFF that he wanted the issue 
resolved by 4 May . l S I It is apparent that Takeshita. throughout the 
second phase. consistently applied pressure on the LOP and MAFF and 
tried to achieve an earlier successful conclusion to the beef talks. 
(Third phase) 
After the break up of the Sato - Yeutter talks on 4 May. 
Takeshita took very little time to decide that Japan should also 
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abandon the idea of an import surcharge. Five days after the 
Yeutter-Sato talks, the Japanese government .ade a state.ent that 
the issue should be resolved not at the GATT panel but bilaterally, 
and ruled out the possibility of taking the issue to the GATT. On 
13 May, the Nihon Keizai Shi.bun reported that Takeshita had 
strongly recom.ended the issue be resolved before the Toronto 
Su •• it in mid June, and that the import charge should be replaced 
by tariffi cation as a condition for liberalization . 152 Responding 
to Takeshita's determination, on 19 May Abe ordered Hata to obtain 
the acceptance by the LOP of the tariffication of imported beef. 
153 Hata's effort appears to have been successful and on 21 May 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary publicly said that Japan would abandon 
the idea of the iaport charge on beef. 154 
On 4 June, Takeshita had a talk with Reagan in London, 
and agreed that the beef issue should be resolved on a bilateral 
basis as soon as possible. After the su .. it, the ta ks between the 
two countries were accelerated and following a concession by the 
U. S. on the level of the tari ff on illPorted beef, the final 
agreement was reached on 20 June. 
(Prime Minister's influence over each political actor) 
To make it c lear it seems appropriate to look separately 
at Takeshita's influence over MAFF, Zenchu and agricultural tribe 
pol it icians. 
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[MAFF] 
On this particular issue. the PM exerted considerable 
influence over MAFF. On 21 June the Nihon Keizai Shi.bun reported 
that in early May MAFF officials were shocked at the strength of the 
Prime Minister's determination that the idea of import surr.harge be 
abandoned. ISS Furtherlllore. senior MAFF officials who were 
involved in the talks admitted that there had been some instructions 
froID the Prime Minister's office to MAFF. IS6 Both provide further 
evidence that the dramatic shift in the position of MAFF fro. 
adherence to the import surcharge to that of accepting the 
introduction of tariffication was the result of the strong 
influence of Prime Minister Takeshita. 
[Zenchu] 
At several trilateral meetings of MAFF bureaucrats. tribe 
politicians and Zenchu. agri cultural tribe politicians suggested to 
Zen chu that Japan might have to make a large concpssion to the 
U.S. on the beef issue. IS1 It remains unclear whether this 
suggestion originated with the Prime Minister or not. However, 
considering the Prime Minister's effort to isolate Zenchu fro~ 
the decision - making process during the first phase. it seems 
likely that it was Prime Minister's power and the effort of the 
'masters' of the agricultural tribe that prevented Zenchu fro~ 
exerting influence over the policy-making proc.ess in the beef talks. 
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[Agricultural tribe politicians] 
As was mentioned above, it was Takeshita's deter.ination 
that enabled the 'masters' of agricultural tribe to persuade the 
'mob' to give up the idea of an import surcharge in the third 
phase. Kato's speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club on 17 May 
showed that the 'masters' expected Takeshita's political power to 
resolve the beef issue: 
Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, contrary to the 
doubts of some when he come to office, has shown his 
ability to handle well our key external relationship 
with the United States. He has established cordial 
relations with President Reagan. His skills at 
compromise within the Japanese political system 
have proved an important element in the resolution 
of the dispute over const ru ction . ... Today the 
beef and citrus issue is the main specific dispute 
in the U.S.-Japan relationship. The value of trade 
involved in this dispute is relativelY li.ited, but 
beef and citrus are politically and sy.bolically 
import~nt in both countries. IS8 
From the discussion above it would see. then that 
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the hypothesis e.ployed in this chapter provides a .ore adequate 
explanation of the Japan's policy .aking process in the beef talks. 
In other words, the Prime Minister in co.b i nation with agricultural 
tribe politicians supporting the Pri.e Minister played a crucial 
role in the policy-making process of the U.S. -Japan beef talks. 
(Source of a PriMe Minister's power) 
One question r emains to be answered . Why did Takeshita 
have a large amount of influence over this particular issue? 
Firstly, as George points out, he held an extremely strong position 
in his party in the post - 1986 election Diet. He was also the 
leader of the largest faction of the LOP. 159 Because of his strong 
political position bure a ucrats wer e bound to fo l low his 
instruction. 160 
Secondly, the agricultural political tribe put more 
emphasis on maintaining good U.S . -Japan relations overall than 
on excessively protecting their domest ic lives t ock industry, so much 
so that Takeshita obtained support from the agricultural tribe 
relatively early when the beef talks be came highly political. 
Inoguchi and 1wai, in their study on Japanese political tribes, 
conclude that agricultural tribes firmly believe that in U.S. -Japan 
relations economics and politics are indivisible. and that in 
dealing with trade disputes between the two countries they .ust 
also take the security and political i.plications of such disputes 
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into consideration. 161 In the beef talks in 1988. agricultural 
political tribes understood that the beef dispute should not be 
allowed to hurt security and political relations between the two 
countries. 
Thirdly. the overall trend was towards the liberalization 
of Japanese agricultural markets. making it easy for Takeshita to 
persuade domestic political actors to accept the liberalization of 
Japan's beef market . Tsurudome, a member of Zenchu said "In 
February 1988 thp. Japanese government announced to liberate 8 
agr'cultural products out of 10 which were judged as GATT illegal 
in December 1987. Zenchu was shocked with this judgment in the 
sense that if the beef issue were to be put to the GATT it should 
be judged as GATT illegal and Japan will be for ced to open up its 
market. This judgment produced a force towards liberalization of 
Japan's agricultural markets, and Zenchu could not resist this 
trend. "16 2 Apart fro~ this judgment, there has been ~ growing 
recognition within Japan since mid 1980s that as a major economic 
power Japan should take responsibility in maintaining the free 3nd 
open international econo.ic system. 163 
Another question may be raised: why did Takeshita 
liberalise Japan's beef market? This Question goes beyond the scope 
of this paper. Nevertheless some tentative re~arks .ay go some way 
to providing an answer. One clear direct cause of his decision was 
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th Reagan-Takeshita talks held in January and June . In those 
mep.t j ngs. Reagan and Takeshita reportedly agreed that the beef 
issue should be resolved between the U. S. and Japan. not at the 
GATT . One may say that this is a sign of bilateralis • . However. 
considering the fact that Japan opened its beef markets to 
Australia under the same conditions as those negotiated with the 
U. S .. it would appear that Takeshita's emphasis was on the 
maintenance of good U.S.-Japan bilateral r elations but not at the 
expense of third countries. 
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This paper has examined the explanatory validity of the 
conventional .odels of the Japanes~ policy-.aking process using the 
liberalization of the beef market in 1988 as a case study. 
It has found that Statism, Pluralism and Elitism are 
deficient as explanations of the policy-making process that led to 
the beef liberalization of Japan. Statism, in focusing solely on 
the role of bureaucrats in making policies. cannot explain why MAFF 
accepted the liberalization as inevitable . The interest groups of 
Japan can hardly be said to have had any influence on the final 
outcome of the policy making process. which reveals a flaw in 
Pluralist model at least in this particular case. The Elitist model 
cannot explain why agricultural tribe politicians agreed to the 
introduction of tariffication. 
Neo-Elitism. which focuses on the leadership taken by LDP 
power brokers and top government figures. especially the Prime 
Minister. seems to be able to fill the gap of thpse shortcomings. 
It was the leaders of agricultural tribe politicians who regarded 
liberalization as inevitable in the first phase of the negotiations. 
and who compelled ~AFF officials to make concessions to the U.S. 
on liberalization. These leauers. such as Hata and Kato. received 
instructions fro. the Prime Minister. It was strong deter.ination 
on the part of Takeshita that made Japan concede to the further 
concession of admltting tariffication. thereby opening up the 
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possibility of a successful conclusion to the talks. 
Neo-ElitiSil can be characterized as follows: 
(1) The .ost important political actors are Pri.e Minister 
(2) Interested political tribes. in response to the will of Pri.e 
Minister. exert large a~ounts of power over the policy-.aking 
process. 
(3)The sort of political tribe involved in the process depends on 
specific issue being addressed. 
This model is in stark contrast to the conventional notion 
of the Japanese decision - making process which .ainly emphasizes 
consensus building among a nu.ber of political actors concerned. 
It also contradicts the popular notion of the Japan Inc. model or 
the bureaucratic dominant decision -making model. 
The emergence of political power brokers such as the 
Pr ime Minister and leaders of tribes can be explained by the LDP's 
extremely long term in office. budget restraints since the oil 
shock and the increasing friction among bureaucrats that was 
mentioned earlier. 
The paper demonstrated the growing influence of the Pri.e 
Minister and the 'masters' of political tribes over the 
policy -making process in Japanese politics. and showed that they 
6 0 
tend to behave on the basis of the co.prehensive interests of Japan 
rather than representing a particular interest within Japan. 
It is beyond the purview of this paper to speculate on 
whether the Neo-ElitisM model has any validity for other issues . 
However, it is possible to make at least one general observation. 
Although the political power of Prime Minister Takeshita did not 
stem from the transforaation of the Japanese political system and 
is largely a result of his personal capability as a politician. the 
the key role played by political tribes in policy -making can be 
described as a new trend in Japanese polit.ics. Powerful politicians 
such as Kato and Hata are expected to take up the position of Prime 
Minister in the near future. It can be concluded therefore that 
there will be a growing number of cases in which the best model for 
policy making .ill be Neo-Eliti~. 
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The U.S.-Japan beef agree8ent in 1988 
The Government of Japen will implement the fOllowing 
~arket-openlng measures on beef, subject to necesaary 
do~estic proc~dure. including Diet approval. The meaaures 
will be i~plemented in , manner consistent with the 
most-favoured-nation principle of the GATt. 
1. On April 1, 19'1, tho import quota on beef will be 
elimin.t~d. Consequent17, the Llveatoc~ Indu~t~ 
Promotion Corporation (LIPC) will no longer be involved in 
the purchase and 1.1el uf imported beef. 
2. (ACCESS IMPROVEMENT HEASURtS DURING TKE TRAHSIrIO~\L PERIOD) 
Duting the tr~nsltional period preceding the 
elimination ot the import quotas (JFY 19a8-JFY 1990), 
~arket Iccess will be improved through th6 toll~wlng 
mea.ures. 
2.1 (1'OTAL IMPORT (JUOrA) 
The total import quota ~n beef will be incr64sed In 
accordance with the following schedule: 
JFY 1988 
JFY 1989 
JfY 1990 
(metric tons) 
27.,00(1 
334,000 
3H,OOO 
ri . 
, 
. 
2.2 (CHILLED BEEF AND AGED BEEF) 
Tbe Government of Jap.n il of the view that, under a 
stlble a~pply-de3lnd situation, the total minimum Innull 
import level of chilled beef Ind l;e4 beef, which will be 
1~~orte4 on a global bllia, ~lll be increlled 1n 
accordanca with tbe followin9 Ichedule: 
(seetde toni) 
JFY 1988 48,000 
.rn 19at 
JTY lUO 
58;000 
68,000 
In caae of fluctuationl 1n the IUpply-demlnd 
situation, the .nnual import lev~l m.y fill below the lald 
levell. 
2.3 (TARIF' MD IMPORT MAJUWP) 
~~~ing the transitio~al ,8r104 pr~ce41ng the 
elimin3tion of the import quotal, the tlriff on beef will 
be ml1ntained at 25 perc6nt ad Yllorea. Effortl will be 
made to comprea4 t he ave r4~~ level 0: i~pc ~~ m~ r~up by the 
LIPC to • level belo~ that of JFY 1986. 
A." (SBS) 
Th3 share of imported b~8t trlnsact.~ under ~h. SB8 
system .in the annud purchlla of lrnported beef by Ind 
throu9b the LIPC will be increased in .ccor~.nce wlth the 
fnl1owin9 schedule: 
-
-
• .•. • tf' ,. ,': ; ' . ....... ' •• 
JFY 1988 
JFY un 
JFY 1990 
. . ~, .: .. - ' .. 
30\ 
45\ 
60\ 
. ..... 
(See the Attachment for ~re technical ma~terl) 
2.5 (~RIVAT£ QUOTA) 
"l" .• ~ ...... ,. . 
During the tran.itional period precedibO the import 
quota .11~in.tlon, the private quota will be maint.ined at 
e leyel not le8s th.n thlt which 1. proportionate to the 
1987 l~vel in relati~n lo total imports. 
2.6 (OKINAWA QUOTA) 
The special quota for Okinawa will be increased, in 
view of the .upply-demand .ituation, to the following 
}e,el. : 
JFY 19&8 
JiY 1989 
JI--r 1990 
l.7 (SCHoor, LUNCH UUOTA) 
(metric ton.) 
8,01)0 
10,:100 
12,000 
The level ot the Ipeclll quota for .chool lunch will 
b~ ~etermin~~ b, sed u~on tho SU2p17-~e~and si t uat on 
during the transitional perl~ p!~cedin; ~hs quota 
el1rllinltion. 
2.8 (HOTEL IMPOHT QOOTA) 
During the transitional period p,e~edin9 tb~ 
elimination of the import quota, the Governm~nt o£ Japan 
will maintain the hotel impcrt quota which constitutes 
= .. _ .. _0< ... _ .. - _ ._ .. .. ~ = ~. ."".- " " ~ , '" ., 
Ii 
part uf the total iaport quota, an4 incl ••••• ~ch quote to 
the follewing level.: 
2.9 (Doo) 
JlY uea 
JFY 19., 
JlY 1"0 
(metric tuna) 
10,000 
13,000 
16,01>0 
The Deman4 DeY.lOP~Dt OUota will b. eli~inlt.4 troa 
the secol14 half of JFY uaa allocetion. 
3. (POST-LIBERALIZATIOY !ORO" MEASURES) 
3.1 (RORMAL TARIFF JlAnS) 
The Covernment ot Japan will implem~nt toriff rate, 
In .ccor~.nce with the following .chddule: 
JFY un 
JFY lUl 
JFY un 
70\ 
60\ 
50\ 
3.2 (EMERGENCY ADJUS1'M!h"T MEASURES) 
(1) If import. of beef incr6as8 to .uch In e%tent that 
the volume 1. 11k~ly to .x~.e~ the t~ll~~in~ l~v~!, th: 
G07&rnment ot Japan will re~uest con~ult . tlon. wi t h the 
90vernm~nt. concerned including the Governm6nt ot 
Australi. with the objective ot limiting the iMfort level 
within tbe .ai4 level, and take necess.ry ~~.surel in 
accG:d~nce with the re!ult Gf the consultations. 
When the Government ot Japan m&k~s thl. r~quest for 
consultetion$, the Gov~rnment ot Japan will make an 
offici a! .nnounceme~t to thit eft~ct. 
l 
· "" "-'.' 
The lev~l; I) JfY 1991 the lmount equivllent to 120\ 
of whichever is the grelter 
of the fullowing; 
I) thf! import quot. for JrY 1990, or 
b) the .mount of the import :~corded 
in JFY 1990. 
II) JFY 19'2 the lruount equivalent to 120\ 
of whichever is the greater 
of the following: 
3) the level for JFY It~l is 
mentioned in I), or 
b) the amount of the import racorded 
in JfY 1991. 
III) JfY 1993 tbe an.ount equivalent to ]20\ 
cf whichever is the greater 
of the following; 
a) the level for JfY 1932 a. 
lIlentloned in II). or 
b) th~ amount of the im~or t: tecordea 
in JFY 1992. 
(2) If agreements are not reached with III the 
90vernments c.:onceorned Includh.9 tha Government: of 
Au.tralll within 30 d.y. alter the reQuest for the 
aboye-m~nttoned consultations. and wh~~ imports in the 
fl.cIl year exceed the level as mentlo~ed in (1), the 
followln9 adjusted tariff rate will he applied from a date 
.et by tho Government of Japan, which will b. "Vet 45 day • 
• fter the date on which the Government of J.p.n requ •• ted 
consult.tiona, until tbe end of the .ame fi.cII y.ar. 
JFr 1'91 95\ 
JFY 1992 
JFY un 
15\ 
75\ 
(3) In addition to the abov., the concrete l~plement.tlon 
of emer9~ncy ... sur.s will be mad. in accordance with the 
Attaclur.ent. 
3 .3 (MEASURES IN AND AFTER ,7ri 19 9 f) 
(1) The norm.l tariff rata for and after JFY 1994 will 
not be r.ised above tha tariff level ior JFY 1'93 .nd will 
be Eubject, at that l.vel, to t.riff negotiation. in the 
Uruguay ~ound. 
(2) ID and after JFY 1994, border .e.lure. will be 
consistent with th~ result of the negotiation. in the 
Uruqc ay ~oun~ ~~d t~a GATT rule, including rul •• for tr.d~ 
in agr1cultur.1 products. 
, 
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